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HEARTS AND MINDS AND LAWS: LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND
DIPLOMATIC PERSUASION
CHRISTOPHER J. BORGEN*

INTRODUCTION

While political observers at least from Tocqueville onwards have

commented on "American exceptionalism," that term took on new
connotations during the eight years of the Bush Administration.
Robert Kagan-who,

along with William Kristol, founded the

neoconservative Project for a New American Century in 1997-set
out his conception of U.S. exceptionalism in his article, Power and
Weakness. For him, to understand American exceptionalism in the

realm of foreign and military affairs, one first had to appreciate what
the rest of the world was like. Europe no longer had traditional

security threats and was styling itself as a sort of "postmodern
paradise."' It was inward-looking and satisfied that it had found a set

of rules that fostered peace and prosperity, at least within Europe.
However, there were, by contrast, the tough places in the worldswaths of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia-that were outside this
post-modern paradise. These states, in Kagan's view, were still mired
in the modern and the pre-modern world of Hobbes. The United
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. This Essay
benefited from comments and suggestions from Lori Outzs Borgen, Peggy McGuinness,
and Brian Tamanaha. I am also grateful for the comments of the participants in the South
Texas Law Review Ethics Symposium, held in September, 2008. Finally, I would like to
thank Professor Geoff Corn both for organizing the symposium and for his helpful
comments, and also the editors and staff of the South Texas Law Review, especially Editor
in Chief Bryan Hanna, for their suggestions and fine editorial work. Any mistakes are
solely my own. The main text of this article was completed in March, 2009.
1. Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, POL'Y REV., June & July 2002, at 3, 25
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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States was the exception; it had to navigate between these worlds,
maintaining security for the post-modern world by remaining engaged
with the modern and the pre-modern. This had implications for
international law: the United States had not incorporated the
relatively rigid legalism of those who lived their lives within the postmodern paradise because of its need for flexibility to be able to
address the problems emanating from the rest of the world.
International law was fine for the paradises of the world, but of
little use for those who had to venture into the areas where history
had not yet ended. Thus, U.S. presidential administrations-and
especially that of George W. Bush-have had world views that
emphasized flexibility over legalism.
But it is one thing to value flexibility over legalism-if that is
defined as a pedantic and narrow reading of law-it is another thing
altogether to go beyond eschewing narrow legalism to actually
ignoring the law. The neoconservatives in the Bush Administration
held two somewhat contradictory views about international law. Some
were actively hostile to there being international legal regulation of
U.S. actions. Others seemed to allow for some role for the trappings
of international law, such as legal memoranda, Security Council
Resolutions, and so on, but were instrumentalists to an extreme in
their use of law. Neither of these groups seemed to consider
international law as something that may exist outside of the decisions
of the Administration's lawyers. Ultimately, they did not appreciate
that, in international relations, law matters and that the reputation of
the United States as a law abiding country also matters.
While the United States may be facing new threats, at least one
constant remains: International law is both the language and the
grammar of international relations. To a large extent it defines what
can and cannot be said in modern diplomacy:
Law structures the relations among States by providing a
common frame of reference. It is the language of international
society: to present one's claims in legal terms means to signal
which norms one considers relevant and to indicate which
procedures one intends to follow and would like others to
follow.,
Yet, while the Bush Administration argued that legal constraints
were least relevant in matters of national security and warfighting,
these constraints matter most internationally: "Law has become the
2. Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation:The Authority of Interpretive Communities,
12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371, 376 (1991).
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common vernacular of this dispersed elite [of experts involved in
military issues], even as they argue about just what the law permits
and forbids." 3
This Essay considers the role of international legal argument in
the war on terror and, in particular, in the attempts to justify the use
of military force. Part I looks at challenges posed by the evolution of
military conflict and how this affects diplomacy. In particular, I argue
that a reputation for honoring one's treaty commitments and for
legality, more generally, is an important part of fostering cooperation
and undercutting the support of our adversaries. Part II focuses on
how the Bush Administration moved between hostility to
international law and attempts to rewrite the rules of international law
concerning the use of force. Finally, Part III considers some of the
effects of these legal policies on U.S. foreign policy.
I.

A.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND THE CRAFTING OF A
DIPLOMATIC NARRATIVE

The Challenges of New Conflicts

The war on terror has been called a "fourth generation" conflict,
to use a term that was defined in an influential article in the Marine
Corps Gazette in 1989.' Using this scheme, the mass warfare
exemplified by the Napoleonic Wars was the first generation. The
Industrial Revolution spurred the second generation, which was
typified by the harnessing of entire economies to produce war
materiel. The second generation peaked with the widespread
deployment of new weapons, such as the machine-gun and poison gas,
in World War I. The third generation reacted to the trenches and
picket lines of the second generation by adapting new transportation
technology (cars, trucks, tanks, and planes) and devising new
strategies of maneuver warfare. This generation was fully realized in
World War II with the use of the blitzkrieg, but aspects of it can be
seen in the 1991 Gulf War.
The laws of armed conflict shifted and adapted in each of these
instances to respond to the new ways that war was fought. But, in each

3. David Kennedy, Modern War and Modern Law, Address Before the University
of Baltimore School of Law (Oct. 26, 2006), in 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 173, 179 (2007).
4. William S. Lind et al., The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,
MARINE
CORPS
GAZETTE,
Oct.
1989,
at
22,
available
at
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th-gen-wargazette.htm.

772

SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:769

case, the change in law was an attempt to curb the worst proclivities of
the combatants, not enable them.
Since World War II, the framework for the law of armed conflict
has included the United Nations Charter, concerning issues of the use
of force (ius ad bellum) and the four Geneva Conventions, concerning
conduct in an armed conflict (ius in bello or international
humanitarian law). This Essay will focus on use of force issues, with
some mention of international humanitarian law topics.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force in
disputes between member states. It envisions the Security Council
managing the use of international violence and, through a
determination that there is a threat to international peace and
security, authorizing the use of force in certain instances. The Charter
also allows for individual and collective self defense when the U.N. is
unable to act. As Thomas Franck explains, the U.N. essentially has a
two-tiered system concerning the use of force: (a) an upper tier which
posits an ideal world in which no state would use violence but, if one
did, it would be met through the collective force of the U.N. via a
determination of the Security Council, and (b) a lower tier which
would allow for individual and collective self defense when the U.N. is
unable or unwilling to counter aggression in a timely manner.
This schema was almost immediately under stress by multiple
developments. The Cold War brought the Security Council to near
deadlock.6 States increased the use of covert operations and proxy
combatants rather than standard declarations of war, making it more
difficult to assign responsibility for violations Technological advances
made waiting to be attacked a risk that states were increasingly
unwilling to take and made attacking first-or anticipatory selfdefense-more common.8 Finally, increasing concern of human rights
and the memories of the Holocaust made states more willing to
intervene militarily in order to prevent a humanitarian crisis.9
Today we live in an era defined less by superpower conflict than
by a myriad of "small wars." Due in part to the advent of cheap and
powerful computers and global communication, this is a time when
individuals and small groups are able to act in a manner-for good or
evil-that formerly had been the preserve of states. Consider not only
5.

THOMAS

M.

FRANCK,

RECOURSE

THREATS AND ARMED ATrACKS 3 (2002).

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
See id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id.

TO

FORCE:

STATE

ACTION

AGAINST
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the United States hunting down al Qaeda but also Israel fighting
Hamas in Lebanon and the constantly mutating struggle for Somalia.
The enemies of the United States are no longer necessarily other
states organized in formal bureaucracies but increasingly are substate
organizations including terrorist networks, drug cartels, marauding
pirates, separatist belligerents, and so on." Armed conflicts
increasingly straddle the line between "traditional" war and
counterinsurgency. The future of warfare will look less like the 1991
Iraq campaign-armored columns storming through the desert-and
more like Iraq in 2004-a complex mix of occupation and
counterinsurgency-or Mexico in 2009-with aspects of both law
enforcement and urban combat."
These developments in organized violence-the commodification
of computing power, the expansion of communication capabilities, the
shift from hierarchical to networked organization, the sharing and
improvement of tactics and technology-are combined with an older
strategy of irregular warfare "to waste the strength of the strong-to
bleed the target state dry morally and economically."' 2 These are
conflicts not only among communities but often within communities.
In such situations the public's perception is crucial:
[W]hen the strong are seen beating the weak (knocking down
doors, roughing up people of interest, and shooting ragtag
guerillas), they are considered to be barbarians. This view,
amplified by the media, will eventually eat away at the state's
ability to maintain moral cohesion and drastically damage its
global image.
As the state's soldiers continue to fight weak foes, they will
eventually become as ill disciplined and vicious as the people
they are fighting, due to frustration and mirror imaging ....
Citizens lose their feeling of solidarity with the goals of their
government when they perceive it to be acting immorally. 3
In such a conflict, it is important to maintain a sense of cohesion
and the rightness of one's cause. Fourth generation conflicts are, in
the words of military analyst John Robb, "primarily moral conflicts"
where "[t]he key is maintaining moral cohesion."' 4

10. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 197 (1991)
(concerning the new enemies of states as "terrorists, guerillas, bandits, and robbers").
11. See JOHN ROBB, BRAVE NEW WAR: THE NEXT STAGE OF TERRORISM AND THE
END OF GLOBALIZATION 27 (2007).

12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 26-27.
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We can think of the state speaking to three audiences. One
audience is a state's own citizenry, which needs to believe in the
rightness of the state's policies that are likely to spill both blood and
wealth. A second audience is foreign governments; allied governments
will need to be bolstered, neutral governments persuaded, and
enemies warned of our resolve. This is the realm of diplomacy. The
final main audience is the citizenry of other states. This is the arena of
public diplomacy, of how a state "tells its story," not to other
governments (that is traditional diplomacy) but to the publics of other
states. And, increasingly, the language of international law plays an
important part in crafting credible narratives for all three audiences.
B.

Compliance, Reputation, and Legitimacy

As much as pundits write about global hegemons (like the United
States) and regional hegemons (such as Russia), being able to act
unilaterally on matters of national security, states often prefer-and
may need-the participation of other states. Diplomacy-both in its
traditional form and in the new form of public diplomacy-is more
important than ever: "a strategic principle for the network age [is that]
the advisable way to out-compete is to out-cooperate."" Absent some
level of cooperation, national bureaucracies are unlikely to be
effective against transnational terrorist networks. 6 Moreover,
dominant states cannot simply impose or project their norms on
others; the process is interactive and requires the "offering up of
reasonable arguments." Reasonable arguments are those that fit
within a wider context of shared understandings about the rules
of international life. If they do not fit, they are not likely to be
persuasive and no amount of material power is going to change
that. 7
The ability to persuade other states using nonmilitary means has
been called "soft power., 18 Such power "is inherently inter-subjective;
those on whom it is projected must accept and internalize the values,
ideas and understandings that are espoused."'1 9
15.

John Arquilla & David F. Ronfeldt, Netwar Revisited: The Fight for the Future

Continues, in NETWORKS, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL INSURGENCY 8, 14 (Robert J.

Bunker ed., 2005) (footnote omitted).
16. Id. at 14-15.
17. Ian Johnstone, US-UN RelationsAfter Iraq: The End of the World (Order)As We
Know It?, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 813,819 (2004).
18. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN
WORLD POLITICS (2004).

19.

Johnstone, supra note 17, at 820.
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Harold Koh explains that a key component of soft power is a
state's good reputation for compliance. As he put it, "the process of
visibly obeying international norms builds U.S. 'soft power,' enhances
its moral authority, and strengthens U.S. capacity for global
leadership in a post-September 11 world., 20 Moreover, according to
Andrew Guzman: "A reputation for compliance with international
law is valuable because it allows states to make more credible
promises to other states. This allows the state to extract
21 greater
agreement.,
international
an
negotiates
it
when
concessions
Even if a reputation for compliance can at times be beneficial to
states, that does not mean that states will actually comply with a legal
rule; they may simply seek to conceal their noncompliance or, if that is
not possible, differentiate their activities in an attempt to maintain
that the legal rule they are allegedly breaching does not, in fact,
apply.22
While this is surely true, it is important to note that whether or
not those legal arguments are credible depends on factors outside of
the control of the individual state; as Ian Johnstone put it, soft power
is "inter-subjective." Consequently, there are limits as to what can be
credibly argued. Johnstone explained that:
Law is not infinitely manipulable. It cannot be wielded
randomly ... because if its invocation is to have the desired
effect, the proffered interpretation must be credible to intended
addresses. After all, if the relevant interpretive communities do
not attach any credibility to a State's claim that its actions are
within the law, the claim would be meaningless and therefore
pointless. 23
Thus, states seeking allies for coordinated action need to both
maintain a reputation for respecting their international obligations
and, when they act in a manner that is legally questionable, they need
to be able to justify it using a reasonably credible legal argument. No
mere figleaf is enough.
Credible legal arguments are needed if a state wants its
arguments to have any type of legitimacy. An interpretation of
international law that is legitimate can "pull" other states towards

20.

Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1480

(2003).
21. Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and InternationalLaw, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 379, 383 (2006).
22.

Robert 0. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Interests,

Reputation, Institutions,93 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 375, 377 (2000).
23.

Johnstone, supra note 2, at 418.
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adopting such an interpretation or at least accepting the action of the
state in question. 4 An interpretation that is perceived as legitimate
thus eases cooperation and decreases the risk of sanctions.
In light of the foregoing discussion, one of the problems that the
United States faced in the post 9/11 world is that it responded with a
series of interpretations of international law that were highly
questionable and a series of actions that were perceived as being
illegitimate. Thomas Franck explained the ramifications:
A grave responsibility is thus incurred by those who undermine
the general belief in the independent capacity of law to affect
compliant behavior, even if they direct their attack to one
particularly vulnerable subset of laws. For, in essence, the
debate is not merely about Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. It is
not just about whether a universal treaty adhered to by 191
countries is a disposable instrument. It is about the weighing of
power against legitimacy.
It is a struggle for the soul of the
25
community of nations.
We will turn to that struggle in Part II.
II. LAW AND THE DIPLOMATIC HIGH GROUND IN THE WAR ON
TERROR
A.

Legitimacy and the War on Terror
In March 2003, on the eve of the Iraq War, Fareed Zakaria wrote:
America is virtually alone. Never will it have waged a war in
such isolation. Never have so many of its allies been so firmly
opposed to its policies .... In fact, the debate is not about
Saddam anymore. It is about America and its role in the new
world .... A war with Iraq, even if successful, might solve the
Iraq problem. It doesn't solve the America problem. What
worries people around the world [above all else] is living in a
world shaped and dominated by one country-the United
States.26

24. Regarding legitimacy more generally, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990) (stating "[I]egitimacy is a property of a rule or
rulemaking institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed
normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process").
25. Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power:
InternationalLaw in an Age of Power Disequilibrium,100 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 91 (2006).
26. Koh, supra note 20, at 1524-25 (quoting Fareed Zakaria, The Arrogant Empire,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 24, 2003, at 18, 20-23).
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The "America problem" that the world faced was, for the United
States, actually a two-pronged legitimacy problem. As Zakaria
described, one problem stemmed from the then-pending war with
Iraq. As will be discussed below, the interpretation of the rules of selfdefense that the United States proposed did not sit well with close
allies including Germany and France, let alone with competitors such
as Russia and China. Moreover, this problem was not limited to the
Iraq War but was actually a broader question of whether and how the
U.S. was attempting to redefine the rules governing unilateral military
action. The question implicated (on the one hand) the U.S.'s own
security concerns and (on the other hand) its concerns that other
states, such as Russia or China, could use new interpretations for their
own ends.
The second legitimacy problem for the United States stemmed
from the host of issues concerning the treatment of detainees in the
War on Terror: torture, Abu Ghraib, military tribunals, solitary
confinement, and the ever-increasing list of activities that were of
questionable legality, if not morality. The United States is no stranger
to criticism of its human rights practices, but in years past those
criticisms have often been about U.S. hypocrisy in being quick to
condemn the human rights abuses of its enemies but slow to address
the abuses of its allies. However, the moral clout of the United States
dropped to a new low during the Bush Administration. Beyond
turning a blind eye to the bad acts of our allies, the United States itself
resorted to torture and to undermining the legal regime against
torture with the use of indefensible legal interpretations." Foreign
political leaders as well as average citizens both from foreign countries
and from the United States were shocked by the ongoing revelations
of the use of harsh interrogation techniques, "black sites," and so on.
This sapped the United States of the ability to speak with moral
strength while it simultaneously energized anti-American rhetoric.
In this short Essay, though, I do not wish to focus on the
arguments concerning the treatment of detainees, issues of due
process, the use of torture, renditions, and so on. These issues have
been well analyzed and do not need recounting here. What I do want
to focus on is how, at a time when promoting the rule of law and
maintaining ethical legitimacy should have been important aspects of
27.

The simple fact that the Bush Administration, on its last day in office, disavowed

the pre-existing Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memos speaks volumes of the shoddiness
of the legal arguments they had made. See generally Memorandum from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Jan. 15, 2009),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memostatusolcopinionsOll52009.pdf.
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U.S. policy, the Bush Administration adopted a rhetoric that was
actually hostile to international law.
B.

The Neoconservative Turn from InternationalLaw

For all the talk of "American exceptionalism," Harold Koh posits
that this concept is muddled. He explains that there are actually four
types of American exceptionalism: a distinctive conception of rights
(such as the American emphasis on racial equality); the use of
different labels for related concepts (such as where the world uses
terms like torture, we speak of "cruel and unusual punishment"); the
"flying buttress mentality" (which views the U.S. as being supportive
of international law yet does not allow international law within itself);
and finally the use of double standards.28
Of these types of exceptionalism, double standards are especially
troubling in the context of the War on Terror. As Koh writes:
[B]y espousing the double standard, the United States often
finds itself co-opted into either condoning or defending other
countries' human rights abuses, even when it previously
criticized them (as has happened, for example, with the United
States critique of military tribunals in Peru, Russia's war on
Chechen "terrorists," or China's crackdown on Uighur
Muslims) .29

But, the Bush Administration went beyond double-standards to
adopting a rhetoric that was hostile to international law. In 2005, the
National Defense Strategy promulgated by the Department of
Defense warned that: "Our strength as a nation state will continue to
be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using
international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism." 3 This was not
just inartful turn of phrase but was U.S. policy. It was emblematic of
an attitude of the Bush Administration that international law, far from
being important to uphold, was a threat to the United States and its
interests.
This was reinforced by neoconservative pundits. Some U.S.
commentators started using the term "lawfare" to describe law being
used as a weapon, often against America.31
28.
29.

Koh, supra note 20, at 1483-86.
Id. at 1487.

30.

DEP'T. OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

(2005),
available
at
OF
AMERICA
5
http://www.defenselink.miI/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds2.pdf.
31. Phillip Carter, Legal Combat: Are Enemies Waging War in Our Courts?, SLATE,
Apr. 4, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2116169/.

2009]

HEARTS AND MINDS

The neoconservative view is epitomized by John Bolton, who
seemed to object to international law largely for its constraining of
unilateral U.S. action.32 In making John Bolton the U.N. Ambassador,
the Bush Administration sent to the United Nations "a lawyer who
has written that international law is not law as we know it
domestically, but rather a matter of political understandings adopted
for the convenience of states and subject to unilateral change when
such understandings prove inconvenient."3 3
Thus, many influential people in the Bush Administration
believed that international law was not really "law." For example, by
emphasizing domestic statutes over treaties, neoconservatives only
allowed treaties moral or political (as opposed to legal) weight."
Charles Krauthammer argued-before September 11th-that the
United States should set aside international law and act as it wants:
America is no mere international citizen. It is the dominant
power in the world, more dominant than any since Rome.
Accordingly, America is in a position to reshape norms, alter
expectations and create new realities. How? By unapologetic
and implacable demonstrations of will.3
At times, the Bush Administration practiced "A la carte"
multilateralism-turning to the U.N. and international law when it
suited them, other times trying to adjust the content of international
law, but often just ignoring international law and institutions. Instead
of arguments based on law, the Bush Administration employed a
moralistic rhetoric of good and evil. America was against an "axis of
evil." President Bush described the war against terror as a "crusade,"
an especially poor choice of words as, "[flor many in the [Middle
East], it underscored Western colonialism, Israeli occupation, and the
current U.S. domination."36 The result of supplanting legalism with a
Manichean moralism was the polar opposite of the goal of public
diplomacy: rather than telling America's story in a manner to
32. Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial, Hegemonic InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 843,
845 (2001).
33. TOM FARER, CONFRONTING GLOBAL TERRORISM AND AMERICAN NEOCONSERVATISM: THE FRAMEWORK OF A LIBERAL GRAND STRATEGY 62 (2008). But
contrast this to the European view, concerning which Martti Koskenniemi wrote: "I often
wonder to what extent international law is becoming a political theology in Europe."

Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 113, 120 (2005).
34. Vagts, supra note 322, at 846-47.
35. Charles Krauthammer, The Bush Doctrine,TIME, Mar. 5, 2001, at 42.
36. Lamis Andoni, Deeds Speak Louder Than Words, in THE BATrLE FOR HEARTS
AND MINDS: USING SOFT POWER TO UNDERMINE TERRORIST NETWORKS 262, 274
(Alexander T.J. Lennon ed., 2003).
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persuade the citizens of other states, the Bush Administration
Bush put it,
antagonized the so-called "Arab street." As 3President
7
"[e]ither you are with us or with the terrorists.
In the absence of legal argumentation, it was difficult to actually
foster a sense of legitimacy. The United States was viewed as a
hypocrite that only invoked international law to control others. In the
capitals of Europe, there was a growing concern about unilateralism
and trustworthiness. There was also an increasing sense that the
United States was not concerned with upholding international law.
Finnish scholar and former diplomat Martti Koskenniemi voiced the
view of the Europeans who believed that for the United States,
"[1]egalization, is just a policy choice, a matter of costs and benefitswith no 3a8 priori reason to believe that the latter would outweigh the
former.
Thus the Bush Administration chose as a matter of policy to try
to loosen the strictures of international law on itself and to increase
the indeterminacy of the law's rules (at least applied to the United
States). However, many of these norms had been established in
international law due to the efforts of the U.S. since the Second World
War. Now, because of those efforts, those norms had become
accepted as legal principles by many states. Those states became
defenders of the rules of international law that had previously been
espoused by the U.S. but were now being either loosened, repudiated,
or ignored by the Bush Administration. As a practical matter, this
meant that attempts to revise the norms of non-intervention, the
multilateral management of conflicts, and criminal liability for certain
breaches of international humanitarian law were met by deep
skepticism.
The Bush Administration seemed to oscillate between ignoring
international law and an extreme instrumentalism which sought to
rewrite the rules of the system to suit the present needs of the United
States.39 Either way, the views of the other members of the
interpretive community were all but ignored.

37. Id. at 265.
38. Koskenniemi, supra note 33, at 117.
39. Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the
Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369, 378-79 (2005)
(explaining dominant states do not usually maintain static approaches to international law
but rather "oscillate" between instrumentalization and withdrawal).

2009]
C.

HEARTS AND MINDS

The (Mis-) Use of Legal Arguments Concerning Military
Intervention

Although the Bush Administration had not placed a priority on
engaging the international community on issues of international law,
this was a time when a careful consideration of the norms of the
community was all the more important. While Bush Administration
officials were derisive of international courts and fora, they also did
not truly appreciate that
[o]n the international stage, there is only the "Court of World
Public Opinion." As a lawyer, advising the military about the
law of war means making a prediction about how people with
the power to influence our success will interpret the legitimacy
of our plans. What will our allies or our own citizenry say? If we
will need the cooperation of citizens in Iraq, or Lebanon or
Pakistan, what will they have to say? We have seen the cost in
political legitimacy and international cooperation that comes
when we play by rules others don't recognize.:
At first, there seemed to be at least some attempt in the weeks
and months following September l1th to engage the international
community. Via the U.N. Security Council, the United States
attempted to rework international law of the use of force to include
new rights of intervention that had not been articulated until that
point.4' Jos6 Alvarez points to the Security Council revamping the
rules of the use of force with three new general norms: (a) the
reconfiguration of certain types of terrorist violence as an "armed
attack for purposes of UN Charter" Article 51 rights of self-defense;
(b) the harboring of terrorists as justification for the use of military
force against a state; and (c) although an ongoing terrorist threat may
be unpredictable, the use of force against a state harboring terrorists
does not necessarily "become impermissible retaliation or illegal
anticipatory self-defense, or exceed the rules of proportionality."42
These new rules are "exceptionally indeterminate." 3
Yet, while the United States was able to foster a new
understanding of international law that legitimized the invasion of
Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq was another matter.

40. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 184.
41. Concerning the "new rights," see Krisch, supra note 39, at 395. Concerning
"hegemonic capture," see Josd E. Alvarez, Editorial, Hegemonic International Law
Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873, 873-74 (2003).
42. Alvarez, supra note 41, at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Id. at 881.
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Arguments that tried to link Iraq to September 11th were
problematic. Moreover, many countries considered whatever threat
Iraq posed to the United States to be so remote as to deny any
argument that the United States could strike based on any reasonable
interpretation of self-defense. Ultimately though, it became clear that
the United States would invade Iraq with or without a new Security
Council resolution.
However, despite its hostility to international law, the Bush
Administration did not say it was setting aside international law in its
invasion of Iraq. International law still had some sway to the extent
that the Administration made desultory arguments that the United
States was acting in furtherance of international law by upholding
Security Council resolutions. (This seemed like a mere figleaf.)
Perhaps more significantly, President Bush enunciated what became
known as the Bush Doctrine, a revision of the principles of selfdefense to allow early intervention without having been attacked or
without an attack being imminent.' If generalized into an actual legal
rule, this interpretation would give broad leeway for unilateral use of
military force in anticipation of a theoretical armed attack that may
occur at some future, unspecified date. Based on the understood
framework of the international law of the use of force (even including
the post-September 11 adjustments), the international community did
not find this interpretation persuasive.45 To the other extreme, many
argued it was dangerous.
The Bush Administration's use of questionable legal arguments
regarding Iraq, and particularly its arguments widening the possibility
for unilateral military intervention, stands in sharp contrast to the
legal arguments of American leaders in previous administrations.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for instance:
Abram Chayes, who was State Department Legal Adviser at
the time, states that the looser interpretation of article 51 was
not adopted by American officials partly because it would have
weakening the 'normative atmosphere' in
set a 'bad precedent'
46

which States act.
In the run-up to the invasion of Grenada, Reagan Administration
officials focused on what legal principles it used:

44.
See MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 178-79 (2008).

45.

See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 17, at 830-31.

Johnstone, supra note 2, at 415 (quoting ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 65 (1974)) (emphasis added).
46.
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One could quibble about facts, [State Department lawyer]
Michael Kozak would later suggest, but it was important that
there be "nothing new in international law."
Too facile an appeal to law, the Legal Adviser's Office
recognized, might well come back to haunt the Reagan
administration. The Legal Adviser's Office was particularly
concerned that it not create a justification for "another
Afghanistan." Accordingly, [Legal Adviser Davis] Robinson's
letter deliberately eschewed appeals to "humanitarian
intervention" and to "new interpretations" of the U.N. Charter's
article 2(4). 47
Thus, "[i]f the United States were to endorse a self-defense
rationale, Kozak feared, it would open a gap in article 51 that armies
could march through, armies that
48 in the future might not be those of
the United States and its allies."
Perhaps because the Bush Administration did not take
international law seriously, it made arguments that undercut the very
foundations of the law of the use of force. It acted in a way that
maximized short-term flexibility and damaged the reputation and
efficacy of the United States (at least into the medium-term) and may
have weakened some of the foundational principles of international
law.

III. POWER, RESPONSIBILITY, AND REPUTATION
In 1943, Winston Churchill told an American audience: "The
price of greatness is responsibility., 49 Today, the United States is in a
position of great power that makes it especially influential in shaping
international law. In Wilhelm Grewe's history of international law, he
found that for the last five hundred years, "[tihe hegemon in each case
led the way in formulating the international law rules of the time. '
The policies of the Bush Administration proved to be troubling not
only for America's ethical standing in the world but also for the
evolution of international law.

47. Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Decision to Invade Grenada: A TenYear Retrospective, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 765, 770 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
48. Id. at 795 (footnote omitted).
49. See Winston S. Churchill, The Price of Greatness Is Responsibility, Address
Before the Military and Naval Forces in Training at Harvard (Sept. 6, 1943), in 80 FINEST
HOUR
24
(1993),
available
at
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=424.
50. Vagts, supra note 32, at 844.
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First, the Bush Administration seemed to conclude that
reputation was not that important due to the predominant power of
the United States. Some theorists have previously argued that:
Once the United States became a great power, and particularly
after it became hegemonic in the West, other countries could
not avoid dealing with it. The United States was "the only game
in town," and even if its reputation51suffered, other governments
had little choice but to deal with it.
However, this reasoning misses the other half of the equation: In
a world of transnational threats, America has little choice but to deal
with the rest of the world. The willingness of other states to cooperate
with the U.S. on issues ranging from extradition of criminals to the
allocation of troops for a military intervention is in part reliant on the
reputation of the United States for abiding by international law (Will
the extradited suspect face torture? Is this intervention legal?).
Beyond the Bush Administration's cavalier attitude towards
America's reputation in the world, there was its oscillation between
hostility towards international law and extreme instrumentalism that
sought to rewrite some of the basic rules. Thus we had the winnowing
of the Geneva Conventions, the expansion of the unilateral use of
force, and so on... all under cover of legal memoranda that have
since been repudiated by the Bush Administration itself. 2
Between unburdening itself of concern over a reputation for
lawfulness and drafting legal arguments that mocked the very law it
supposedly interpreted, during the Bush Administration abandoned
the use of credible legal arguments.
This had the potential to be especially damaging since, due to its
position of primacy, the United States has a unique responsibility in
shaping international law and acting as law's steward. By contrast, the
Bush Administration adopted a sort of "predatory hegemony" in the
field of international law. A predatory hegemon was "less willing to
subordinate its own interests to those of its allies; instead, it tended
more and more to exploit its hegemonic status for its own narrowly
defined purposes.""
While such a strategy may have increased its short-term
flexibility, the longer-term effect was a loss of reputation, prestige,
and influence. This spilled over into other areas beyond the War on

51.
52.

Keohane, supra note 22, at 377.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, supra note 27.

53.

ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

345 (1987).
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Terror and the War in Iraq. For example, in the crisis surrounding the
Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, the Russians seemed to
have been less concerned by the reaction of the United States than
with the lack of support from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
("SCO"), the nascent security organization consisting of Russia,
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 4
Furthermore, France, not the United States, took the lead in
diplomatic engagement from the West in the early days of the
conflict.55 After its arguments trying to support its invasion of Iraq, the
United States was not in a position to criticize others on issues of
territorial integrity and the use of force.
Moreover, "Russia is not alone in questioning the consistency of
the United States' responses to territorial conflicts around the world
or the evenhandedness with which the West doles out labels such as
'democratic,' 'terrorist,' or 'rogue state."'56 As we look beyond the
Iraq War and back to the broader set of foreign policy challenges
faced by the United States, how the U.S. is perceived by the citizens
and leaders of other countries is vital as "[in the future, the real
contest will be over which powers are best able to spin their flaws and
speak convincingly to an increasingly savvy world citizenry that is as
skeptical about the United States' messianic democratizing as it is
' 57
about Russia's nationalist posturing.
Rather than the predatory legal hegemony of the Bush
Administration, wise leadership would build institutions that would
serve the common good, and provide long term stability and equity;"
in other words, help build an international system the great power
would want to be a part of, even when it was no longer a great
power. 59
The structure of international law must play a key role in the
broader strategy of the United States in addressing threats to its
security and its use of force overseas. Law is especially important in an
era of fourth generation warfare. David Kennedy explains that:
54.

See Charles King, The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis,

FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2008, at 2, 2-6.
55. See France: Cease-Fire, Not Peace Reached in Georgia, CNN, Aug. 12, 2008,

http://m.cnn.com/cnn/ne/europe/detail/152454/full;jsessionid=C9FD314B
5564E6C32E.
56.

King, supra note 54, at 4.

57.

Id. at 11.

97D84948AA6

58. See, e.g., ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 246-47 (1984) (concerning the value of

institutions during a period of hegemonic decline).
59.

Id. at 246.
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[L]aw now offers the rhetorical-and doctrinal-tools to make
and unmake the distinction between war and peace. As a result,
the boundaries of war can now be managed strategically.
Take the difficult question-when does war end? The answer
is not to be found in law or fact-but in strategy. Declaring the
end of hostilities might be a matter of Election Theater or
military assessment. Just like announcing that there remains "a
long way to go," or that the "insurgency is in its final throes."
We should understand these statements as arguments. As
messages-but also as weapons. Law-legal categorization-isa
communication tool. And communicating the war is fighting the
60
war.
Due to their ideological dislike of international law, the
neoconservatives of the Bush Administration, in their ideological
repulsion from international law, ignored that international law is a
crucial tool in statecraft. In her confirmation hearing testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Hillary Clinton
echoed Suzanne Nossel's formulation of "smart power" when she
said,
I believe that American leadership has been wanting, but is still
wanted .... We must use what has been called smart power, the

full range of tools at our disposal-diplomatic, economic,
military, political, legal, and cultural .... With smart power,
diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy."
The relationship between law and international relations is a
complex one. Sometimes law is used as an instrument of power.
"bad"
and
instrumentalism
"good"
is
there
However,
as a
law
using
be
would
instrumentalism
instrumentalism. Good
means towards broader goals of the international community (such as
peace and prosperity) without destabilizing the structure of
international law. Bad instrumentalism, by contrast, is the use of law
for the narrow goals of one (or only a few) state(s), especially if it is
being used in such a manner as to undercut international law in one or
more substantive areas. The Bush Administration moved further and
further into the realm of bad instrumentalism during its term.
As we have seen, while international law can enable power, it can
also constrain power.

60. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 182-83 (emphasis added).
61. Rick Klein et al., "Smart Power" is Clinton's Vow at Hearings,ABC NEWS, Jan.
13, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics[President44/Story?id=6631347&page=l. A more
thorough discussion of "smart power" can be found in Suzanne Nossel, Essay, Smart
Power, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 131,132.
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In either case, international law is ignored at the ignorer's peril.
This is a lesson that many in the United States seem to have learned
from our experiences in the past eight years.
America is exceptional in many ways. But being able to turn its
back on international law without any consequence is not one of
them.

